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Abstract 
Empirical findings in the intergroup conflict literature show that individuals’ beliefs that mark 
differentiation from out-groups become radicalized as intergroup tensions escalate. They also show that 
this differentiation is proportional to tension escalation. In this paper, we are interested to develop an 
agent-based model which captures these findings in order to explore the effect of perceived intergroup 
conflict escalation on the average number of emergent extremists and opinion clusters in the population. 
The proposed model builds on the 2-dimensional bounded confidence model proposed by Huet et al 
(2008). The results show that the average number of extremists has a negative correlation with intolerance 
threshold and positive correlation with the amount of opinion movement when two agents are to reject 
each other’s belief. In other words, the more tensions exist between groups, the more individuals getting 
extremists. We also found that intergroup conflict escalation leads to lower opinion diversity in the 
population compared with normal situations.   
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1- Introduction 
Typically people are more comfortable with those who are similar with themselves or with those 
who perceived as in-group members. The phenomenon is called homophily and is one of the 
most widely accepted and empirically proven observation in the social psychology (Lazarsfeld 
and Merton 1954; Burt 1991). With homophilous behaviors comes ignorance of or 
differentiation from people of out-groups. This discriminatory and biased behavior of people 
based on the perceived in-group/out-group membership may trigger or intensify the intergroup 
conflict.  
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There are several social psychological theories which have tried to explain the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms of differentiation. Cognitive Dissonance theory is an attitude formation 
paradigm proposed by Festinger (1957). Cognitive dissonance occurs when there is an 
inconsistency between two or more beliefs which are hold simultaneously. This dissonance is 
“psychologically uncomfortable” and therefore motivate people to achieve a balanced state 
which may achieved by differentiating from opposing beliefs. Other theories such as the 
reactance theory (Brehm 1966) and social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961) assert that 
in some cases people shift their attitudes in the opposite direction of whom they are interacting 
with.  
Differentiation is the underlying mechanism which leads to the emergence of pluralism, 
polarization, and radicalization in the society (Isenberg 1986). The aim of differentiation could 
be to maintain or to achieve superiority over out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986), to avoid 
betraying in-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986), to maintain in-group solidarity (Bulbulia and Sosis 
2011), or to protect in-group sacred values (Atran and Ginges 2012). However, categorization of 
people into different groups itself does not trigger intergroup conflict. There should be some sort 
of motivation that activates the discriminatory behaviors toward out-groups (Fiske 2002). 
Several social psychological theories have attempted to provide a plausible explanation for the 
forces that cause intergroup conflicts. These theories vary from interpersonal to social influence 
based theories. 
Early theories on intergroup conflict tried to explain the emergent intergroup conflict as a result 
of individuals’ prejudice and discrimination. Theories like the theory of Authoritarian 
Personality (Adorno et al 1950) and different versions of the Theory of Frustration, Aggression, 
and Displacement (Berkowitz 1962) are well-known instances of this category. The main 
drawback of this line of theories is the ignorance of social influence over individuals’ behavior. 
From the social influence point of view, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif 1966) 
postulates that the real conflict of interest between groups triggers the intergroup conflict. 
Another theory concerning the cognitive basis of intergroup differentiation is the well-known 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1978). Social Identity Theory states that group membership creates 
in-group feelings which may cause to favor in-group traits, values, and characteristics. However, 
the social identity theory (Tajfel 1978) and the subsequent self-categorization theory (Turner et 
al 1987) fail to provide a motivational driver for the process of in-group identification and 
intragroup derogation, particularly that of chronic and long-term identification. 
Social pressures to favor one’s own group through in-group/out-group bias lead groups to 
differentiate themselves from one another (Tajfel 1974, 1975; Turner 1975). The amount of 
differentiation varies by degree, from neglecting out-groups to murderous hostility toward 
threateningly perceived out-groups. The presence of explicit conflicts of group interests 
intensifies the positive attachment to in-groups and leads to antagonistic inter-group relations 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986). The more intense the inter-group conflict, the more likely that 
competing groups will act based on their group identification (Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
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Social psychologists studying intergroup conflict show that individuals’ out-group attitudes can 
be predicted by the extent to which they are identified with in-group values. Deschamps and 
Brown (1983) found that when subjects are primed to categorization, the comparability of 
groups’ roles increases the intergroup differentiation. In an attempt to empirically examine the 
utility of different social psychological approaches on intergroup relations, Brown et al. (1986) 
conducted an experiment among shop floor workers in a factory. They found that perceived 
intergroup conflict has strong positive correlation with differentiation. They also found that the 
amount of contact is negatively and the strength of group identification is positively correlated 
with differentiation, but these correlations are weak. To examine the relationship between 
strength of identification with a political party and the amount of differentiation from other 
political out-groups, Kelly (1988) showed that “in-group identification and perceived material 
conflict were consistent predictors of intergroup differentiation along evaluative and affective 
dimensions but not along the dimension of perceived intragroup homogeneity”. Moreover, 
empirical findings show that when differentiation need is activated in individuals, they generate 
more negatively evaluated categories compared to when the inclusion need is activated 
(Leonardelli et al. 2010). 
Despite the rich literature on intergroup conflict and intergroup differentiation, there is a need to 
build computational models to explore the emergent high-level patterns of individuals’ opinion 
formation in presence of intergroup conflict. A plausible direct consequence of the presence of 
intergroup conflict is the emergence of individuals with radical beliefs. The process is called 
Radicalization and has received attention within social psychology from its inception. One 
important research question in studying extremism is to investigate why and how individuals 
with radical beliefs come to believe what they believe. Are they holding radical beliefs because 
they have interacted with other extremists or they could become radical just by interacting with 
moderate people? What are different plausible pathways or mechanisms for becoming an 
extremist? 
So far, we discussed that the amount of differentiation does increase in certain situations 
(Deschamps and Brown 1983), and that perceived intergroup conflict has strong positive 
correlation with differentiation (Brown et al. 1986). The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect 
of perceived intergroup conflict escalation on the average number of emergent extremists in the 
society. We develop an agent-based model that links the micro-level findings of intergroup 
conflict and intergroup differentiation literature to the macro-level behavior of the population. 
The proposed model is an extension of the 2-dimensional Bounded Confidence model with 
rejection mechanism (2D BCR) proposed by Huet et al (2008). We randomly assign the agents to 
m groups and by assuming that the intergroup conflict exists a priori in the population, and that 
agents differentiate more if they perceive more intergroup conflict (Brown et al. 1986), we let 
agents to move farther from out-groups’ opinion compared to in-group fellows. Before going 
through the model, we briefly review related agent-based opinion dynamics models in section 2. 
In section 3, we present our extended model that captures intergroup conflict escalation and 
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differentiation. Then we discuss the simulation results for various parameters in section 4. 
Finally, we conclude the paper in section 5. 
2- Agent-based Opinion Dynamics Models 
Agent-based modeling is the fast growing approach to study the collective behavior of large 
number of people. Many agent-based models have been proposed for opinion dynamics using the 
social psychology theories. Most of the existing ones are based on the fact that people get closer 
together after interaction. The underlying interpretation of these models is that of homophily. 
They assume that there exist some “attractive forces” between individuals when they hold 
similar beliefs. Two widely used models of this category are Bounded Confidence (BC) model 
(Deffuant et al 2000; Hegselmann and Krause 2002) and Relative Agreement (RA) model 
(Deffuant et al 2002). 
There are two well-known opinion dynamics under bounded confidence models that have been 
independently proposed by Deffuant, Weisbuch and others (DW) and Hegselmann and Krause 
(HK) in 2000. The two models are very much alike, but differ mainly in their communication 
regimes and slightly in updating mechanisms. While DW model considers random pairwise 
encounters at each time step in which agents may compromise or not, the HK model allows 
agents to communicate with all other agents and adopt the average opinion of those who fall in 
their area of confidence. For a survey of continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence 
models see Lorenz (2007). Similar to Huet et al (2008), we follow the DW version of the BC 
model in this paper.  
In the DW model, agents have continuous belief, ranging from 0 to 1. The agents interact in 
randomly dyadic encounters and they are allowed to adjust their belief if their difference in belief 
is less than a pre-defined threshold called “uncertainty”. As the uncertainty increases, the agents 
converge to an average belief, but the number of opinion clusters reduces. The DW model fails 
to create extremists agents because it only considers the attractive forces between individuals. 
While in the DW model the uncertainty thresholds are assumed to be equal for all agents, in the 
RA model, the authors let the uncertainty change as a function of time. As a result, after each 
random pair interaction, both agents’ belief and uncertainty are updated and therefore the 
influence is no longer symmetric. However, similar to DW model, the RA model fails to capture 
the differentiation mechanism in dyadic interaction. 
Several researchers have tried to model the emergence and propagation of extremists in the 
population using agent-based opinion dynamics models. They attempt to study radicalization by 
adding some extremist agents in the population with extreme belief but much lower uncertainty 
threshold (Deffuant et al. 2002), asymmetric confidence and biased confidence (Hegselmann and 
Krause 2002), weighting the influence of agents through a Gaussian function with uncertainty as 
standard deviation (Deffuant et al. 2004), examining the effect of network topology (Amblard 
and Deffuant 2004), assigning separate uncertainty thresholds for attraction and rejection (Jager 
and Amblard 2005), incorporating findings from Self-Categorization theory (Salzarulo 2006), 
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comparing different continuous opinion dynamics models including the BC model, the Gaussian 
BC model, the RA model, and the Gaussian BC model with interlocutor uncertainty (Deffuant 
2006), examining the striving for uniqueness among agents (Mäs, Flache, and Helbing, 2010), 
and introducing open- and close-minded agents in the population (Lorenz 2010). 
In an effort to include the rejection mechanism in the DW model, Huet et al (2008) propose a 2-
dimensional BC model which allows the agents to reject other’s belief when they are in a 
dissonance situation. That is, when two agents are close in one attitude and far enough in 
another, they are in a dissonance state and therefore they want to resolve it by shifting away from 
each other in that close attitude. By incorporating this repulsive force into the BC model, some 
linear clusters form in attitude borders representing the emergence of extremism in the 
population. In another work, Huet and Deffuant (2010) introduce a new version of the BC model 
which is based on the Wood et al (1996) empirical results. While the model is still 2-
dimensional, one attitude is considered as a main or important one and the other as a secondary. 
If two agents are close in primary attitude (difference is less than attraction threshold), they get 
closer in both attitudes. However, if they are far enough in primary attitude (difference is greater 
than rejection threshold), then they are in dissonance state and try to solve it by shifting away in 
secondary attitude. The results showed that high rejection threshold leads to the formation of 
clusters having extreme opinions for the secondary belief.  
To extend the BC model, Kurmyshev et al (2011) used a heterogeneous population by 
incorporating two types of agents: friendly agents and partial antagonistic agents. While the first 
type always tries to reach people and get closer to them, the latter exhibits repulsive behavior in 
its interactions. They found that in high uncertainty situation and in equal proportion of two 
agent types, radical opinion changes would arise.  
3- Intergroup Differentiation Escalation Model  
In this section we present our agent-based model which is an extension of the 2-dimensional BC 
model with rejection mechanism proposed by Huet et al (2008). Our modifications derived from 
the well-grounded social psychological findings (Deschamps and Brown 1983; Brown et al. 
1986; Kelly 1988; Leonardelli et al. 2010). For clarification purposes, first we describe the Huet 
et al’s (2008) model and then describe our modifications. Let’s consider a set of N individuals 
each having the following characteristics: 
1) Opinion: a 2-dimensional vector containing x1 and x2 representing real numbers ranging 
from -1 to +1, reflecting the belief of node over two different issues. The continuous 
opinion can be interpreted as the extent to which agents are in favor of or against to a 
given issue. 
2) Uncertainty: a 2-dimensional vector containing u1 and u2 representing by real numbers 
between 0 and 1 reflecting uncertainties related to x1 and x2 respectively. 
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At each simulation time step, instead of allowing each agent to interact with all of its neighbors, 
a pair of individuals is randomly selected to interact and update their belief. Here they condition 
the updating process based on the values of beliefs and uncertainties. Suppose agent i has beliefs 
x1i and x2i with uncertainties u1i and u2i, and agent j has beliefs x1j and x2j with uncertainties u1j 
and u2j. For sake of simplicity, they assume that all nodes have same uncertainties U. Then, agent 
i compares its beliefs with j’s and updates its beliefs. The general rule is that agents approach 
each other if they are close enough in both beliefs. Otherwise, they may ignore each other or 
reject and shift away. More formally, if:  
�𝑥1𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑗
𝑡 � ≤ 𝑈    𝑎𝑛𝑑   �𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑗𝑡 � ≤ 𝑈  
Then the two agents’ beliefs fall in their bounded confidence interval. Thus, they get closer to 
each other based on the following equations: 
𝑥1𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 �𝑥1𝑗𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 �                (1) 
𝑥2𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 �𝑥2𝑗𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 �                (2) 
In these equations, µ is a constriction factor used to limit the convergence velocity. The 
assumption is that µ is constant and equal for all agents throughout the simulation. Another 
possible state is the case that two agents are close in one belief but far in another one:  
 
�𝑥1𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑗
𝑡 � > 𝑈    𝑎𝑛𝑑   �𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑗𝑡 � ≤ 𝑈  
Here, depending on whether the difference is less than a certain threshold or not, two cases arise. 
To represent that threshold, they consider the “intolerance threshold” 𝛿. Therefore, if the 
difference is below the predefined threshold, meaning:   
 
�𝑥1𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑗
𝑡 � ≤ (1 + 𝛿)𝑈 
The dissonance is not strong enough to trigger the rejection. Therefore, the two agents ignore 
each other in belief 1 and approach each other in belief 2.  
  𝑥1𝑖𝑡+1 =  𝑥1𝑖𝑡               (3) 
𝑥2𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 �𝑥2𝑗𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 �             (4) 
However, if the difference is significant enough, meaning: 
�𝑥1𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑗
𝑡 � > (1 + 𝛿)𝑈 
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then the conflict is enough to make agents feel dissonance and thus trigger repulsive action. So 
the two agents shift away from each other in belief 2 and ignore belief 1. The movement should 
be large enough to resolve the dissonance. 
𝑥2𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥2𝑖𝑡 −  𝜇 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 �𝑥2𝑗𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 � �𝑈 −  �𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑗𝑡 ��             (5) 
𝑥1𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥1𝑖𝑡               (6) 
Here psign(.) is similar to sign function, except that it returns +1 if the argument is 0. Moreover, 
the belief values are limited between -1 and +1 by incorporating the following rule: 
 
𝑖𝑓 �𝑥2𝑖𝑡+1�  > 1 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥2𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (𝑥2𝑖𝑡+1) 
Since the model has been built on the cognitive dissonance theory, it assumes that for cases in 
which two agents are far in both beliefs, there is no dissonance between them and therefore there 
is no influence from one to another and they simply ignore each other on both beliefs.  
For our modeling purposes, we modify the 2D BCR model in three ways. First, to make the 
model more realistic by letting agents to interact in a social network structure in which each 
agent has limited number of neighbors. While in 2D BCR model agents are allowed to interact 
with any random agent in the population, we limit this communication to only their immediate 
neighbors. Second, to capture the group identification mechanism, we randomly assign all agents 
to m different groups. Third, we modify the belief updating rule to incorporate empirical findings 
from social psychology literature. In general, the findings state that escalation of the perceived 
intergroup tensions leads individuals to differentiate more from out-groups (Deschamps and 
Brown 1983; Brown et al. 1986). In our proposed model, we assume that a tension between 
groups exist a priori in the population. Moreover, since the findings just held true for 
“differentiating beliefs”, we assume that x1 and x2 are differentiating beliefs. An example of 
differentiating beliefs can be “moral beliefs”, including religious beliefs. The differentiation 
escalation mechanism occurs when the two encountering agents are from different groups. We 
capture the increase in opinion movement by entering an intergroup differentiation escalation 
coefficient β (β > 1) in equation 5: 
𝑥2𝑖
𝑡+1 =  𝑥2𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽 𝜇 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 �𝑥2𝑗𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 � �𝑈 −  �𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑗𝑡 ��            (7) 
The second term in the right hand side of the equation 5 determines the amount that agents shift 
away from each other in dissonance situation. By multiplying the coefficient β (β > 1) in this 
quantity, we increase the movement and let the agents to shift farther away in their beliefs 
compared to the 2D BCR model. As the tension escalates between groups of people, we can 
increase the coefficient β to make agents move farther away. If there is no tension between 
groups, β is set to 1. Based on these modifications, we expect to see more extremists in the 
population, as we increase the intergroup differentiation escalation coefficient β. In other words, 
the number of emergent extremists is a function of β and 𝛿: 
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                                  𝑁𝑡(𝑒) = 𝑓(𝐼𝑡 ,𝛽, 𝛿)                          (8) 
where the 𝑁𝑡(𝑒) represents the number of extremists at time step t, 𝐼𝑡 is the interaction situation 
at time step t (attraction or rejection), 𝛽 is the intergroup differentiation escalation coefficient (β 
> 1), and 𝛿 is intolerance threshold. Table 1 compares the key features of the proposed model 
with some existing agent-based opinion dynamics models in the literature. 
   Table 1: Lite Docking the Agent-based Opinion Dynamics Models 
Variables BC (Deffuant et al 2000)  
RA (Deffuant 
et al 2002) 
Salzarulo 
(2006) 
Huet et al 
(2008) 
Differentiation 
Escalation 
Supporting Theory Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive 
Dissonance 
Self-
Categorization 
Cognitive 
Dissonance 
Brown et al 
(1986) 
Dimension 1 1 n 2 2 
Uncertainty Constant Dynamic N.A. Constant Constant 
Communication Regime Dyadic Dyadic Group Dyadic Dyadic 
Rejection Mechanism × ×    
Differentiation Escalation 
Mechanism × × × ×  
Initial Groupings × ×  ×  
 
4- Analysis of the Results 
In this section, we present and analyze our agent-based simulation results. First we show the 
general behavior of the model and compare it to the original Huet et al (2008) model. Then, by 
designing a virtual experiment, we conduct a series of experiments to examine the effect of key 
factors on the number of emergent extremists in the population. 
4.1. General Comparison with the 2D BCR Model 
We consider a population of 1000 agents each having two beliefs. The initial beliefs are 
randomly assigned to the agents using the uniform distribution between -1 and 1. The 
uncertainties u1 and u2 are assumed to have equal values and held constant throughout the 
simulation. The assumption is that x1 and x2 are differentiating beliefs and agents are in conflict 
escalation situation (i.e. 𝛽 > 1). Since our main focus in this paper is to test the effect of 
intergroup differentiation escalation, we leave out the network structure in this section and set 
the communication regime same to the 2D BCR model.  
Figure 1 compares the evolution of opinions between the Huet et al (2008) model and the 
modified model. In each of the figures, the two axes represent the beliefs which are bounded 
between -1 and 1 and each dot on the figure represents an agent’s opinion. Our assumption in the 
proposed model is that both beliefs are differentiating and there is a tension between groups of 
people. All other parameters are the same. Therefore, we can interpret the results as the changes 
in populations’ belief when the beliefs become differentiating and tensions arise between groups. 
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Similar to the 2D BCR model, after some point, several stable equilibrium points emerge and 
opinion clusters form around those points. Two interaction social forces cause the creation of the 
clusters. On one hand, those agents which are close in both beliefs tend to get closer and form 
groups of like-minded agents. On the other hand, those who hold similar belief in one dimension 
and far enough in another one are separated and pushed away from each other. As a result, after 
some point, some dominant equilibrium points emerge in the population (Huet et al 2008). These 
“meta-clusters” are permanent and do not change their position on the figure. 
 Differentiation Escalation Model 2D BCR Model 
T=100,000 
  
T = 200,000 
  
T = 300,000 
  
Figure 1: Comparison of the differentiation escalation model and the 2D BCR model (U=0.2, 
m=3, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛿=1, 𝛽=1.5). Both axes represent individuals’ opinion. 
An interesting difference between the results is that the number of emergent opinion clusters is 
less in the differentiation escalation model than in the 2D BCR model. In order to compute the 
number of the clusters, we use the algorithm used by Deffuant (2006) and Huet et al (2008). That 
is, we define a minimum distance ε between the agents’ beliefs under which they assign to same 
cluster. In practice we set the minimum distance at ε = 0.15 and neglected the clusters of size 
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lower than %1 of the population size. We run the model for 25 times and report the average 
number of clusters.  
The results reveal that while the 2D BCR model produces 19 opinion clusters with at least 10 
members, the differentiation escalation model leads to 16 opinion clusters. The reason can be 
explained by the role of 𝛽 which increases fluctuations of individuals within the clusters. This 
increase in fluctuations enhances the instability of the clusters which in turn increases the 
likelihood of merging between clusters, or in rare cases, the explosion of clusters. This 
mechanism eventually leads to the formation of less number of opinion clusters in the final 
configuration of individuals. This implies that in presence of escalating tensions and 
differentiating opinions, not only the equilibrium points are changed, but also we see lower 
opinion diversity in the society. We explore this phenomenon more in section 4.2.1. 
4.2. Virtual Experiments 
In this section, we design a virtual experiment to test the effect of key variables of the proposed 
model on the average number of emergent extremists in the population. Here we define an agent 
as extremist if the absolute value of at least one of its beliefs is equal or greater than 0.9. 
Previous works have examined the effect of intolerance threshold (Deffuant 2006; Huet et al. 
2008), the initial uncertainty of the moderates (Deffuant 2006), the initial proportion of 
extremists (Deffuant 2006), level of uncertainty (Huet et al 2008), and network topology 
(Amblard and Deffuant, 2004; Weisbuch 2004) on the dynamics and number of emergent 
extremist. Therefore, to avoid the analysis being too complicated and lengthy, here we control 
the convergence parameter, level of uncertainty, and number of agents and just vary the new 
introduced parameters along with the influential intolerance threshold variable. We assign three 
levels of value for the intergroup differentiation escalation coefficient 𝛽, intolerance threshold 𝛿, 
and number of initial groupings m. We also examine the effect of the presence of random social 
network by adding an indicator variable which takes 1 if the agents can only interact with their 
immediate neighbors, and 0 if there is no network structure. We use an Erdös-Rényi random 
network with connectivity probability of p = 0.05. We run each combination 25 times. Table 2 
illustrates our virtual experiment configuration.  
The ANOVA table contains the sources of variation, degrees of freedom, sum of squares (SS), 
mean square (MS), F-ratio test statistics, and the corresponding significance levels (p-values). In 
general, the higher the F-ratio value, or the smaller the probability, the more important the 
corresponding factor. Table 3 presents the result of the ANOVA test for the average number of 
extremists. The results illustrate a significant difference between the various levels of intergroup 
differentiation escalation coefficient 𝛽 (F (2, 1296) = 3.002, p = 0.050) and intolerance threshold 
𝛿 (F (2, 1296) = 1229.465, p = 0.000). When examining the initial number of groupings m, we 
observed a significant difference (F (2, 1296) = 24.525, p = 0.000).  Finally, we found that the 
absence or presence of random network is also significant (F (1, 1296) = 13.694, p = 0.000). 
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           Table 2: Design of Experiments Configuration 
Independent Variables No. of Test Cases Values Used 
Beta  3 1, 1.5, 2 
Intolerance threshold 3 1, 1.5, 2  
Number of initial groupings 3 3, 5, 7 
Social Network 2 Random (p = 0.05), No network 
Control Variables No. of Test Cases Values Used 
Uncertainty (U) 1 0.2 
Convergence Parameter (𝝁) 1 0.3 
Initial Belief Distribution 1 Random  
Maximum Iteration 1 500,000 
Number of Agents 1 1000 
Number of Runs 1 25 
Dependent Variables No. of Test Cases Values 
Average Number of Extremists - - 
The ANOVA table also reveals that there are significant interactions between the intergroup 
differentiation escalation coefficient 𝛽 × intolerance threshold 𝛿 (F (4, 1296) = 22.577, p = 
0.000), the number of initial groupings m × 𝛽 (F (4, 1296) = 2.558, p ≤ 0.05), 𝛽 × random 
network existence (F (2, 1296) = 8.274, p = 0.000), 𝛿 × m (F (4, 1296) = 5.892, p = 0.000), and 
m × random network existence (F (2, 1296) = 9.239, p = 0.000). This means that the 
simultaneous influence of independent variables on the average number of emergent extremists 
is not additive. That is, the relationship between each of the interacting variables and the 
dependent variable depends on the value of the other interacting variable. Further analysis of the 
effect of independent variables is presented in the following three sub-sections. 
Table 3: ANOVA Table for Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source SS 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
MS F P-Value 
Beta 2505.975 2 1252.987 3.002 .050 
Delta 1026453.255 2 513226.627 1229.465 .000 
m 20475.539 2 10237.770 24.525 .000 
Network 5716.507 1 5716.507 13.694 .000 
Beta * Delta 37698.167 4 9424.542 22.577 .000 
Beta * m 4271.563 4 1067.891 2.558 .037 
Beta * Network 6907.471 2 3453.736 8.274 .000 
Delta * m 9838.776 4 2459.694 5.892 .000 
Delta * Network 880.164 2 440.082 1.054 .349 
m * Network 7713.524 2 3856.762 9.239 .000 
Beta * Delta * m 4398.121 8 549.765 1.317 .231 
Beta * Delta * Network 32612.404 4 8153.101 19.531 .000 
Beta * m * Network 524.271 4 131.068 .314 .869 
Delta * m * Network 4917.298 4 1229.324 2.945 .019 
Beta * Delta * m * Network 8721.520 8 1090.190 2.612 .008 
Error 541000.720 1296 417.439   
Total 67483898.00 1350    
Dependent Variable: Number of Extremists 
R Squared = .684 (Adjusted R Squared = .672) 
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4.2.1. Analyzing the effect of 𝜷 
In this section, we analyze the effect of intergroup differentiation escalation coefficient 𝛽 from 
two perspectives: 1) the effect of 𝛽 on the average number of emergent extremists in the society, 
and 2) the effect of 𝛽 on the number of opinion clusters. Figure 2 compares the number of 
extremists in the original 2D BCR model and the intergroup differentiation escalation model 
resulting from 25 numbers of runs. We show the number of extremists for when the interactions 
are restricted by random network and for when there is no network structure. In general, we can 
see that whether the interactions are restricted in a random network structure or not, the 
differentiation escalation model produce more number of extremists compared to the 2D BCR 
model. Also it appears that as the 𝛽 goes up, the average number of extremists monotonically 
increases up to the 𝛽 = 1.8 point, but decreases afterward.  
 
Figure 2: Comparing the effect of 𝛽 on the average number of extremists between the 2D BCR and 
differentiation escalation models (U = 0.2, m = 3, 𝜇 = 0.3, 𝛿 = 1, iterations=500,000). 
The reason could be traced to the amount of movement that the encountering agents undertake to 
differentiate from each other. By pushing agents to shift farther away from each other when they 
are in dissonance condition, more agents tend to reach the opinion borders and become 
extremists. This is an interesting result because it shows that just by changing the social 
interaction regime, more extremists emerge in the population. This supports the claim of Self-
Categorization Theory (Turner et al. 1987) that extremists are the product of simple social 
interactions and that extremism is more likely to be an emerging phenomena rather than an 
intrinsic feature of individuals. That is, even without having individuals interacting with 
extremists in the society, they still can become extremists themselves just by interacting with 
those who holds less extreme beliefs (Urbig and Malitz 2007). The results also are in accordance 
with Isenberg’s (1986) argument that group polarization is a function of “persuasive arguments” 
and “social comparison” and therefore existence of extremists is not necessary for polarization 
and radicalization to occur. 
 
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
235
240
245
250
255
260
265
Beta
A
ve
ra
ge
 N
um
be
r o
f E
xt
re
m
is
ts
 
 
Differentiation Escalation w/ random network
Differentiation Escalation w/o network
2D BCR
13 
 
𝛽 = 1.2 𝛽 = 1.5 
  
β = 2 β = 2.5 
  
Figure 3: Effect of 𝛽 on the number of extremists and clusters  
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛿=1, random network, iteration=500,000) 
 
Figure 4: Analyzing the effect of 𝛽 on the average number of emergent opinion clusters 
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛿=1, random network, iteration=500,000)   
We discussed in section 4.1 that increasing the amount of movement at the time of differentiation 
increases the instability of the opinion clusters by increasing the likelihood of merging or 
disintegration of clusters which in turn decreases the final number of opinion clusters. Here we 
go more in depth and test the effect of increasing the 𝛽 on the number of emerging opinion 
clusters in the population. Figure 3 illustrates the simulation results for different values of 𝛽 and 
Figure 4 show the corresponding average number of opinion clusters obtained by Huet et al’s 
(2008) algorithm. We run the algorithm for maximum number of 500,000 iterations and replicate 
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for 25 times. Both figures suggest that the number of emergent opinion clusters decreases with 
intergroup differentiation escalation coefficient 𝛽. Indeed, as we push agents to shift their belief 
farther away from each other, the equilibrium points relocate and the distance between new 
clusters expands. This suggests that intergroup differentiation escalation reduces the opinion 
diversity in the society and in a way produced a radicalized population. 
4.2.2. Analyzing the effect of intolerance threshold  
Intolerance threshold plays an important role in agents’ selection process of whether to attract or 
differentiate from others. Figure 5 shows simulation results for four different values of 
intolerance threshold 𝛿 (𝛿 =1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5), while holding all other variables constant. 
Observationally, we can see that the number of opinion clusters strikingly increase as the 
rejection condition is restricted. Figure 6 illustrates the corresponding average number of opinion 
clusters (iterations = 500,000; replications = 25), where an increase from 𝛿 = 1 to 𝛿 = 2.5 
increases the average number of opinion clusters from 16 to 29. Thus, we conclude that in 
intergroup differentiation escalation situation, restricting the differentiation mechanism would 
increase the opinion diversity in population. It is worth mentioning that the same trend has been 
found in 2D BCR model by Huet et al (2008).  
𝛿 = 1 
 
𝛿 = 1.5 
 
𝛿 = 2 
 
𝛿 = 2.5 
 
Figure 5: Effect of intolerance threshold 𝛿 on the opinion dynamics 
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛽=1.5, random network, iterations=500,000) 
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Figure 6: Analyzing the effect of intolerance threshold 𝛿 on the average number of emergent opinion 
clusters (U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛽=1.5, random network, iterations=500,000)   
The ANOVA test result in Table 3 showed us that the intolerance threshold 𝛿 has a significant 
effect on the average number of emerging extremists. Figure 7 illustrates the average number of 
extremists when the intolerance threshold 𝛿 moves from 1 to 2.5. We observe that by increasing 
the intolerance threshold, the number of emerging extremists monotonically decreases. This is 
due to fact that by restricting the rejection conditions, people tend to get closer to each other or at 
most ignoring each other’s opinion rather than rejecting and shifting away. The results also show 
that except for 𝛿 = 2.5, at other corresponding intolerance threshold values, the differentiation 
escalation model (with or without existence of random network) produces more number of 
extremists.  
 
Figure 7: Effect of intolerance threshold 𝛿 on the average number of extremists  
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛽=1.5, m = 3, iteration=500,000)  
4.2.3. Analyzing the Effect of the Number of Initial Groupings 
In this subsection we examine the effect of number of initial groupings m on the average number 
of emergent extremists and number of final opinion clusters. Figure 8 shows the final distribution 
of the opinions after 500,000 iterations for different number of initial groupings. Figure 9 
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illustrates the corresponding number of final opinion clusters for each value of initial number of 
groupings. Both figures suggest that the average number of final opinion clusters slightly 
decreases with initial number of groupings m. This could be explained by the fact that increasing 
the number of initial groupings increases the differentiation among agents which leads to less 
number of opinion clusters.   
Table 3 illustrated that changes in the initial number of groupings is highly correlated with the 
average number of emergent extremists in the population. Figure 10 shows the corresponding 
average number of extremists for various values of initial number of groupings m both in 
presence and absence of random network topology. We can see that whether the agents’ 
interactions are restricted only to immediate neighbors on a random network or not, the average 
number of extremists increases with the number of initial groupings m. The underlying reason is 
that on the one hand, the opinions are bounded, and on the other hand, the differentiation occurs 
more when there is more number of pre-defined groupings in the initial population. Therefore, 
more agents are pushed to the extreme limits of the opinions. The results also reveal that random 
network generates more extremists in this configuration of parameters. 
m = 3 m = 5 
  
m = 7 m = 10 
  
Figure 8: Analyzing the effect of the number of initial groupings on the opinion dynamics 
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛽=1.5, random network, iterations=500,000) 
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Figure 9: Analyzing the effect of initial number of groupings on the average number of emergent opinion 
clusters (U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛿=1.5, 𝛽=1.5, random network, iterations=500,000)   
 
 
Figure 10: Effect of initial number of groupings m on the average number of extremists  
(U=0.2, 𝜇=0.3, 𝛽=2, 𝛿=1.5, iteration=500,000) 
 
5- Discussion and Conclusion 
Assuming that there is an interest to control and mitigate the spread of radical beliefs in the 
society, there would be a need for informed policies based on deep understanding of different 
conditions under which one could develop radical beliefs. For example, one could derive from 
the self-categorization theory that the existence of extremists in the society is an emergent 
phenomena rather than an intrinsic property of the individuals. That is, the extremists are not the 
cause of extremism but they are the product of social interactions.  
A body of literature explored the idea that individuals’ beliefs that mark differentiation from out-
groups become radicalized as intergroup tensions escalate (Deschamps and Brown 1983; Brown 
et al. 1986; Kelly 1988; Leonardelli et al. 2010). Their results show that conflict triggers 
identification and differentiation dynamics. Moreover, they find that the more intense the 
intergroup tensions, the more identification and, hence, the more differentiation occurs between 
individual’s opinions. That is, participants in the high conflict condition identified more with 
their in-group than participants in the low conflict condition, who in turn, identified more with 
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their in-group than participants in the collaboration condition. The main idea is that individuals 
may not follow rational decision making when they are in serious conflict. In this situation, they 
may consider some issues as sacred values and become reluctant or even sensitive to 
compromise (Atran and Ginges 2012).  
In this paper, we are interested in exploring the collective behavior of individuals when there 
exist some tensions between groups of people that trigger in-group opinions. Particularly, we 
want to test the effect of conflict escalation on the average number of extremists that are emerged 
as a result of social interactions. We developed our model based on two critical assumptions. 
First we assume that the tensions exist a priori in the society. Second we assume that the beliefs 
that agents are interacting on are differentiating beliefs. The proposed agent-based belief 
differentiation model is a modified version of 2-dimensional bounded confidence with rejection 
mechanism model proposed by Huet et al (2008). We randomly assigned the agents to m groups 
and let them to shift more away from each other if they are from different groups. We captured 
this increase in opinion rejection by introducing the intergroup differentiation escalation 
coefficient 𝛽 into the model. We also incorporate a social network structure which allows agents 
to only interact within their neighborhood. We ran the model for various ranges of parameters 
and observed for difference in number of opinion clusters, change in equilibrium points, and 
level of consensus. We also designed a virtual experiment to systematically test the effect of 
intergroup conflict escalation on the average number of emerging extremists. 
The ANOVA test results support the hypothesis that the average number of extremists is a 
function of the intolerance threshold and the amount of attitude shifting when two agents are to 
reject each other’s belief. In other words, the increase in the amount of opinion differentiation 
would eventually lead to more extremism in the society. By varying the intergroup 
differentiation escalation coefficient between 1 and 2, we see more agents at the border of 
opinions meaning the emergence of more extremists in the population. The reason can be traced 
to the role of 𝛽 which increases the amount of movement when the agents reject each other. In 
our model, in rejection situations, the agents are pushed farther away from the cluster by other 
clusters compared to the 2D BCR model. Since the beliefs are bounded between -1 and 1, this 
increase in the amount of movement increases the distance between clusters which in turn 
reduces the number of emerging clusters. The results also show that the modified model 
produces less opinion clusters which imply that in the presence of tension and differentiating 
beliefs, not only that the equilibrium points are changed, but also we observe less opinion 
diversity in the society. 
Another interesting result coming from our virtual experiments is about the role of social 
network structure on opinion dynamics. Through the ANOVA test, we find that the presence of 
the random network structure does not have a statistically significant effect on the average 
number of emerging extremists in the society. However, the results show that as a result of 
restricting individuals’ interaction in a social network structure, the equilibrium points are 
changed, meaning that opinion clusters are relocated.  
19 
 
Analyzing the effect of intolerance threshold 𝛿 on the dynamics of opinion reveals that it has an 
inverse correlation with the average number of emerging extremists. That is, as we restricted the 
rejection condition by expanding the intolerance threshold, on average we see less extremists at 
the final step. This is mainly due to the fact that people are more likely to attract to or at most 
ignore each other’s opinion rather than differentiating. We also find that more opinion clusters 
emerge as the 𝛿 gets up which means more opinion diversity in the society. 
Future works can test the effect of control variables. Particularly, analyzing the effect of different 
initial belief distribution would be of interest. In this paper, we assume that the initial beliefs are 
uniformly assigned to the agents. One can use other distributions such as normal distribution and 
measure its impact on the dynamics. Another possible direction to extend this work is to create 
the social network structure based on the homophily effect and then assign the initial beliefs 
respectively. That is, people who are connected to each other in the network tend to have more 
similar characteristics and beliefs compared to those who are not connected to them. Finally, 
exploring the effect of conflict escalation and presence of differentiating beliefs on the co-
evolution of the opinion dynamics and the structure of the social network structure at the group 
level would shed lights on dynamics of group membership and the emergence of radical groups 
in the society.        
Note 
The Python code of the model is available in CoMSES Net Computational Model Library at 
http://www.openabm.org/model/4154/version/2/view. 
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